By Mesfin Beyene — Senior Associate
With regard to the Dangote refinery share subscription, Ethiopia’s nascent stock market got a unique opportunity to test its connectivity to a prominent business in Africa. The transaction raised a number of awkward questions. Who would be entitled to buy foreign securities? What does an Ethiopian investor possess in case of holding shares under a nominee account in Nigeria? And what if a shareholder fails to get a dividend, a voting right or any other claim due to miscommunication between the markets?
The Nigerian subscription process , which closed on 27 October 2026, included 4.1 billion new ordinary shares issued at NGN 525 each, resulting in gross proceeds of about NGN 2.15 trillion (roughly USD 1.6 billion). The proposed Ethiopian participation route, announced at an Addis Ababa roadshow, envisaged depository receipts priced at approximately ETB 74.90 and restricted to qualified investors. As of 1 November, the issuer was still checking applications; reporting on the Ethiopian arrangement had described the local receipt listing as subject to further regulatory approval.[1]
These facts call for legal scrutiny, but they do not establish wrongdoing. The real challenge is to make sure that the protection offered by Ethiopian securities law follows the investor all the way from subscription to ownership, trading and enforcement.
Why Ethiopia restricted participation
Article 2(22) of the Public Offering and Trading of Securities Directive No. 1030/2024 defines a high-net-worth individual by reference to at least ETB 10 million in net worth, excluding an automobile and a primary residence. Article 2(46) places such individuals alongside institutions and other recognized categories of qualified investors. Under Article 147(1), an offer relying on this exemption may reach no more than 100 qualified investors without prior ECMA approval for a higher number. Articles 75 and 76 of the Capital Market Proclamation No. 1248/2021 provide the broader registration and prospectus framework.
The restriction is therefore not a special prohibition invented for Dangote. Nor is ETB 10 million the minimum amount a qualified purchaser must invest: it is an eligibility test. That difference matters when a share's apparently modest unit price is compared with the resources needed to gain access.
There is a sensible reason to treat sophisticated or financially resilient investors differently. They may be better able to absorb loss, seek advice and examine complex securities. Still, wealth, knowledge and bargaining power are not interchangeable. A business owner worth ETB 15 million may have no experience with cross-border custody. A skilled financial analyst with less wealth may understand the risks perfectly well but remain ineligible.
The United States Supreme Court made a related point in SEC v Ralston Purina Co, 346 US 119 (1953): the purpose of an offering exemption is linked to the offerees' need for statutory protection and their access to relevant information. That decision does not override Ethiopia's explicit threshold. It does, however, challenge the notion that attaching a label to an investor settles the question of protection. Modern US Regulation D even recognizes specified professional credentials as one path to accredited-investor status.
Ethiopia can retain a cautious qualification regime while asking whether professional competence, regulated advice or diversified investment vehicles might eventually offer additional, carefully supervised routes to participation. Financial inclusion and investor protection need not be treated as opposing ambitions.
Corporate-finance scholarship reinforces the point. Jensen and Meckling's agency-cost framework explains why investors rely on monitoring and enforceable obligations when others manage their money. Ben-Shahar and Schneider have shown why disclosure alone may fail when information is too complex or routine to be used. Neither insight supports treating a signed form as proof that the investor understands every legal arrangement behind a foreign security.
A bank balance is not the same as net worth
A more specific concern arose when Ethiopian Business Review reported a statement attributed to ECMA's director general that the ETB 10 million had to be held in a bank account for the preceding six months. The published definition in Article 2(22) does not itself say that. A person can have substantial net worth in legitimate business assets or investments without keeping the same amount in cash for half a year.
There may be good reasons to examine account histories: an intermediary needs to detect borrowed funds temporarily parked in an applicant's account or other attempts to misstate financial standing. But checking the truth of a net-worth claim is one thing; replacing the test with a mandatory six-month cash requirement is another.
Under Federal Administrative Procedure Proclamation No. 1183/2020, Article 4 connects directives with delegated authority, while Article 50 addresses review of directives that exceed authority or conflict with superior law. An enforceable cash-history condition would need a proper legal basis. The reported remark alone cannot tell us whether such an instrument exists, or whether the official was merely describing a verification practice.
Article 25 of the Ethiopian Constitution also makes differential treatment based on property a serious legal question. Yet constitutional equality does not automatically confer a right to every exempt securities offering. The stronger argument here concerns legality, justification and consistency: if the law says net worth, investors should know why an administrator is demanding something different.
The most important document may be the depository agreement
The proposed Ethiopian arrangement was described as one depository receipt for each Dangote share, with underlying shares held through a Nigerian nominee. To an investor, that may sound identical to ordinary share ownership. Legally, it need not be.
The registered shareholder is generally the person recognized in the issuer's corporate records. A receipt holder may instead have a beneficial or contractual entitlement mediated by a custodian or depositary. The UK Supreme Court's decision in Farstad Supply A/S v Enviroco Ltd [2011] UKSC 16, although decided in another context, shows why formal membership and economic interest cannot simply be conflated.
The economics of a nominee chain deserve attention as well. Hansmann and Kraakman[2] have explained the importance of asset partitioning in protecting claimants. For a receipt holder, that means asking whether the underlying shares are segregated from the intermediary's property and protected against its creditors. A contractual promise to deliver value may be very different from an enforceable interest in identified securities.
The questions are practical. Who receives notices of meetings? Can an Ethiopian holder direct the nominee's vote, and what if the nominee fails to act? How are dividends converted, taxed and distributed? If existing shareholders receive rights to subscribe for new shares, does the Ethiopian holder benefit? Can a receipt be sold to anyone, or only to another qualified investor? What happens to the underlying assets if the custodian becomes insolvent?
Ethiopia's Commercial Code No. 1243/2021 gives useful domestic benchmarks. Articles 278(2), 291 and 451 address class equality, voting and economic entitlements, and the withdrawal of preferential subscription rights. But the issuer is a Nigerian free-zone enterprise. Ethiopian company-law provisions do not automatically govern its internal affairs. Articles 584 and 586 of the Code make the issuer's territorial connections and legal form relevant; they cannot be bypassed either by asserting universal Ethiopian jurisdiction or by assuming that foreign incorporation ends the inquiry.
The same care is needed with Nigerian remedies. Sections 346 and 352 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act 2020 contain derivative-action provisions relevant to certain beneficial owners, but the applicable free-zone framework and the particular receipt holder's standing must be established. A contract may oblige a nominee to cooperate in proceedings; it cannot create a statutory cause of action where the governing law gives none.
None of this condemns depository receipts. Intermediated ownership is common and useful. The UNIDROIT Geneva Securities Convention and the EU's amended Shareholder Rights Directive demonstrate ways to protect securities-account interests and transmit shareholder information. The lesson is that the legal structure must be built, explained and tested. Calling the instrument a share is not a substitute for doing that work.
The finance is attractive; the control questions remain
The prospectus shows approximately 120.129 billion ordinary shares already issued before the offer. Adding 4.1 billion new shares would give new subscribers about 3.3% of the enlarged capital, before any additional issuance. The project documents describe a major refinery expansion estimated at about USD 14.3 billion, financed in stages from a combination of sources. The offer could provide valuable growth capital without transferring anything approaching control of the company.
There is nothing inherently unlawful about that. A primary issuance raises money for the company, unlike a sale of an existing holder's shares. Nor does a reduced ownership percentage necessarily mean an economic loss: issuing new shares at fair value can dilute voting power without destroying per-share value. A discounted issue transferring value, or one undertaken chiefly to entrench controllers, presents a different problem.
German law provides a useful comparison. Sections 53a and 186 of the Aktiengesetz address equal treatment and pre-emption rights. In Siemens AG v Henry Nold, Case C-42/95, the European Court of Justice recognized room for stronger national protections. In Eclairs Group Ltd v JKX Oil & Gas plc [2015] UKSC 71, the UK Supreme Court emphasized that corporate powers must be used for their proper purposes. Neither case proves any impropriety at Dangote. Together they illustrate why capital-raising decisions, pre-emption arrangements and controller influence deserve scrutiny.
The relevant governance questions concern board independence, related-party transactions, future financing and the treatment of minority investors. Ethiopian Commercial Code Articles 295, 316, 317 and 327 offer parallel benchmarks concerning controlling-shareholder conduct, directors' duties and business judgment. Profitability alone does not answer those questions. Nor should an unsuccessful commercial decision automatically be mistaken for breach of duty.
Disclosure is about the security, not just the refinery
A buyer evaluating a refinery naturally looks at production, margins, debt and the expansion timetable. The roadshow reportedly presented strong but unaudited nine-month 2026 figures, including USD 22.5 billion in revenue and USD 4.7 billion in profit after tax. Those figures deserve careful attention, but profits are not distributable cash, and a large expansion could absorb substantial future resources. The prospectus also contains a timetable difference: the expansion discussion refers to completion by 2030, while its use-of-proceeds table lists 2029 for specified components. That calls for explanation, not an automatic allegation of fraud.
The same standard should govern the receipt itself. Investors need to know whether its proposed Ethiopian listing has actually been approved, whether there is a market in which they can sell it, and what restrictions apply. Article 147(6) limits transfers under the qualified-investor exemption unless the securities are subsequently registered. Article 147 also requires eligibility verification, investor acknowledgments and retention of records for ten years; Article 149 requires post-offer notification to ECMA within ten business days. Advertising under Article 147(7)-(8) must be directed to qualified investors and comply with Article 53. A news report about an IPO is not automatically unlawful public solicitation; an unrestricted sales invitation issued by a distributor raises a different question.
Articles 98-100 of the Capital Market Proclamation address deceptive and misleading securities conduct. The US Supreme Court's decision in TSC Industries v Northway, 426 US 438 (1976) offers a useful comparative test: information matters when a reasonable shareholder would regard it as significant to the decision. For a receipt holder, voting limits, custody risk and difficulties selling may matter just as much as the refinery's earnings.
A signed risk acknowledgment cannot make a false description accurate. Investors can accept oil-price volatility, exchange-rate movements and construction delays. They should not be left guessing whether the assets backing their receipts are segregated, whether dividends will reach them or whether the rights advertised are legally enforceable.
Several regulators, several different legal questions
The cross-border structure cannot be reduced to one regulator's approval. ECMA oversees the local securities regime; Nigerian law governs important features of issuance and corporate rights; and foreign-exchange settlement requires its own authority. Article 4 of NBE Directive FXD/04/2026 permits outward investment by Ethiopian entities on a case-by-case basis with NBE approval. It should not be recast as unrestricted permission for any resident to remit funds to purchase foreign shares.
Competition law must also be applied carefully. Ethiopia's Trade Competition and Consumers Protection Proclamation No. 813/2013 excludes securities from its definition of goods while separately addressing services, abuse of dominance and anticompetitive agreements. An eligibility threshold created by securities regulation does not itself prove a cartel or abuse of market power. Anticompetitive brokerage conduct could raise a separate inquiry, but that would require evidence of the relevant market and conduct. The American decision in Credit Suisse Securities v Billing, 551 US 264 (2007), similarly warns against ignoring the interaction between securities and competition rules.
Finally, an investor needs to know where a claim can actually be brought. A misleading Ethiopian solicitation, a custodian's failure to account and an abusive corporate decision in Nigeria may involve different defendants and remedies. Ethiopian Commercial Code Articles 328 and 330 distinguish company claims from direct shareholder injury; Nigeria's Investments and Securities Act 2025 includes prospectus-liability provisions in sections 113-114. The US Supreme Court's Morrison v National Australia Bank, 561 US 247 (2010) is a reminder that international investments do not automatically create access to American securities remedies.
What this transaction should teach Ethiopia
The lesson is not that Ethiopia should prohibit foreign share offerings, or that wealthier investors need no protection. ECMA's cautious approach has a statutory foundation. The rules must, however, be applied as written; the instrument must be accurately described; and every essential link in the custody and enforcement chain must have an accountable party.
That calls for a clear statement of how eligibility is verified, how the 100-investor ceiling is counted when applications are pooled, which intermediaries are licensed for which functions, and whether the Ethiopian receipts have the necessary approvals. The roadshow account also described Ethiopian investors paying after allotment, while the Nigerian prospectus's ordinary subscription terms speak of payment on application. The applicable documents should explain how those different procedures fit together, rather than leave an investor to resolve the discrepancy. Investors should receive accessible terms covering voting instructions, dividends, corporate actions, transfer limits, asset segregation and dispute resolution. Any additional qualification condition should rest on published legal authority. In the longer term, ECMA can consider carefully designed routes for competent but less wealthy investors, including regulated collective products.
A securities market is not judged only by how much money it raises. Its credibility also depends on whether buyers receive the interests for which they pay and can enforce the rights attached to them. The Dangote offer is an opportunity for Ethiopian regulators and market institutions to establish that standard early. The ETB 10 million test may decide who gets through the door. It cannot decide what those investors own once they are inside.
Dangote Official Offer Update. The offer has closed — Dangote Petroleum Refinery (Lite),Ethiopia Business Review, Investors With Br10 Million Can Buy Into Dangote Refinery IPO Through Ethiopian Depository Receipts – Ethiopian Business Review
Hansmann and Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, Yale Law Journal, 2000, P. 399
For legal advice on securities offerings and investor protection in Ethiopia, contact 5A Law Firm LLP.